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It has been long contended that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare with the aim
of advancing political objectives through the spreading of fear. The present set of ﬁve studies explored the relation between need for closure and the social response to terrorism.
We found support for the notion that reminders of terrorist attacks elevate the need for
closure and that the need for closure may enhance ingroup identiﬁcation; interdependence
with others; outgroup derogation; and support for tough and decisive counterterrorism
policies and for leaders likely to carry out such policies. The implications of this research
for the claims of terrorist ideologues regarding the efﬁcacy of terrorism are discussed.

Terrorism is generally considered a form of
psychological warfare that aims to advance political
objectives through the spreading of fear. As Brian
Jenkins (1975), a terrorism expert, has famously put it,
‘‘terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of
people dead’’ (p. 15).
But how exactly is the tactic of terrorism supposed to
work? Classic ideologues of terrorism, such as 19thcentury Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin or the
20th-century ideologue Carlos Marighela, have argued
that terrorism destabilizes the state and unmasks its
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impotence, paving the way to the political alternative
that the terrorists offer. Other terrorist ideologues have
argued for what McCauley (2006) called ‘‘Jujitsu
Politics.’’ By attacking a perceived enemy, terrorists wish
to provoke a strong response. In fact, they hope to elicit
so large a response that it can be labeled immoral. This
lends credence to the terrorists’ claims that the perceived
enemy is in the moral wrong and can help build support
among constituents for their objective. A strong response
also has the advantage of stretching the opponent’s
material and human resources, with the potential to
bankrupt their will and=or their banks. A third possible
objective of terrorist ideologues is to simply instigate a
speciﬁc policy change, such as to pressure a nation to
withdraw troops from a territory.
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Each of the foregoing explanations regarding the
efﬁcacy of terrorism assumes that the threat of terrorism
fosters a sense of psychological insecurity. Consistent
with the terrorists’ ideologies, psychological research
conducted in the aftermath of 9=11 (Schlenger et al.,
2002) and the Oklahoma City bombings (Pfefferbaum
et al., 2001) found that individuals’ levels of stress and
fear increased following these major terrorist attacks,
suggesting that terrorism does indeed result in feelings
of insecurity. This state of insecurity may contain multiple, interrelated components, including of a lack of
safety and uncertainty. Although a lack of safety should
lead to the need for safety, uncertainty should lead to
the need for closure. In this article, we focus our investigation on the uncertainty component of insecurity,
with the prediction that the threat of terrorism leads
to elevated levels of the need for cognitive closure,
deﬁned as the aversion toward uncertainty and ambiguity, with a preference for ﬁrmness and stability in
beliefs and expectations (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
The need for closure is a particularly important variable to study because prior research suggests that need
for closure engenders support for one’s group and its
leadership rather than undermining it. In a recent review
(Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006),
support was found for the notion that heightened need
for closure leads to a syndrome of ‘‘group centrism,’’
including pressures toward uniformity, rejection of opinion deviates, ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation,
and the endorsement of autocratic leadership. Therefore, based on research on the need for closure, we
would expect that elevated need for closure would lead
to increased rallying around the ﬂag.
Indeed, terrorism seems to lead to increased group
cohesion and increased feelings of aggressiveness toward
threatening outgroups. For example, terrorist attacks conducted by Palestinian extremists increased negative stereotyping of Arab groups by Israelis (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001).
In response to the threat of terrorism, Americans became
more religious (Schuster et al., 2001), participated in more
group functions (Schuster et al., 2001), displayed the
American ﬂag to a greater extent (Skitka, 2005), and professed an increased trust in government (Chanley, 2002).
Other studies have found elevated levels of aggression
following 9=11 (Argyrides & Downey, 2004). Even reminders of 9=11, such as the 1-year anniversary of that event,
have been found to increase levels of aggression after they
had declined (Argyrides & Downey, 2004).
The foregoing ﬁndings are consistent with the notion
that individuals cling to their leadership when threatened, a tendency known as the ‘‘rally effect’’ (Mueller,
1973). For instance, President Bush’s approval ratings
rose from 51% in the Gallup poll of September 10,
2001, to a remarkable 86% in the next poll on September
15, 2001, and their magnitude tracked the DHS-issued

color-coded warning of possible terrorist attacks (Willer,
2004). The rally effect is not unique to President Bush.
Following the Iranian attack on the U.S. embassy in
1979, President Carter’s approval ratings surged to
69% and remained elevated 2 months after the attack.
Research from the perspective of social identity theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory
(Turner, 1985) suggests the same general account: Identiﬁcation with one’s group is thought to provide the individual with a self-schema, which is well deﬁned and positively
valenced, reducing aversive uncertainty. Accordingly,
uncertainty evoking events should increase identiﬁcation
with the ingroup. In addition, differentiation between
ingroups and outgroups should be sharper when group
identiﬁcation is a crucial concern: The threat to the
ingroup should increase its importance as a protective
entity, increasing its distinction from the outgroup.
Of particular present relevance, Hogg’s (2000)
theorizing suggests that the motivation to reduce uncertainty accounts for the social identity theory and selfcategorization theory effects. Thus, studies based on
Hogg’s theory have found that an induction of uncertainty increases identiﬁcation with entitative groups
(Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maintner, & Mofﬁtt,
2007). Additional research has shown that individuals
who experience high degrees of uncertainty will identify
with both low-status and high-status groups in an effort
to reduce uncertainty (Reid & Hogg, 2005).
Although the ﬁndings just described are suggestive,
they do not bear directly on issues of insecurity or need
for closure as neither variable was speciﬁcally assessed in
the research being referred to. Furthermore, the ‘‘group
centrism’’ research conducted in the need for closure tradition (Kruglanski et al., 2006) had little direct relation
to terrorism; it employed a variety of innocuous laboratory tasks, far removed from the fear-arousing effect
that the specter of a terrorist attack may produce. The
lone exception was work by Bar-Tal and Labin (2001),
who found that high need for closure was associated
with negative perceptions of Palestinians following an
attack on Israel by Palestinian extremists.
In short, a gap in knowledge exists concerning the
actual relations between terrorism, need for closure,
and the social response to terrorism. To address it, we
conducted several studies aimed at exploring these relations more directly. If need for closure is found to play
an important role in driving the social response to terrorism, this would provide important evidence for a possible
psychological process underlying such a response.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH
Our studies aim to explore the relationship between a
potential surge in need for closure in reaction to
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the threat of terrorism, and the subsequent social
psychological response based on that need. Need for
closure is conceptualized as the desire for a quick and
ﬁrm answer to a question and the aversion toward ambiguity (Kruglanski, 2004; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
This conceptualization suggests that high need for closure individuals would strive to develop strong beliefs,
form clear-cut impressions, and classify objects and
events into sharply deﬁned categories in order to experience certainty and avoid ambiguity. Pertinent to the
present concerns, high need for closure is assumed to
increase the quest for shared social reality (Hardin &
Higgins, 1996), enhancing the tendency to identify with
one’s ingroup that constitutes a shared reality ‘‘provider’’ (Kruglanski et al., 2006).
Need for closure may be aroused situationally by
events that make salient the beneﬁts of closure (such as
the necessity to act in the face of threat) and the costs
of lacking closure but also reﬂects (relatively) stable individual differences in need for closure assessed by a scale
developed for that purpose (Webster & Kruglanski,
1994). Need for closure is assumed to exert similar
effects irrespective of whether it was assessed as an individual difference variable or manipulated situationally.
In support of this hypothesis, previous research has
found convergent need for closure effects on a wide
range of variables regardless of whether this motivation
was operationalized situationally or dispositionally (for
a review, see Kruglanski, 2004).
We conducted ﬁve studies to investigate the relation
between need for closure and the social response to terrorism. To test the basic tenet of terrorist ideologues’
reasoning, our ﬁrst empirical question was whether the
threat of terrorism indeed produces an elevated need
for closure (Studies 1 and 2). In turn, need for closure
should prompt an attitudinal response favoring actions
believed to restore certainty and involving security concerns for the ingroup. Thus, in response to the threat of
a terrorist attack, high need for closure individuals
should identify more strongly with the ingroup and exhibit more negative attitudes toward members of outgroups perceived as potentially supportive of terrorism
(Study 1). In addition to negative perceptions of outgroups, we predicted that speciﬁc U.S. counterterrorist
policies, including controversial ones at apparent odds
with individual rights and humanistic concerns, would
receive a stronger endorsement from individuals high
(vs. low) on the need for closure (Studies 3 and 4). Study
4 tests the additional prediction that the endorsement of
such counterterrorism policies by high need for closure
persons should lead to their greater optimism about
the eventual defeat of terrorism (hence, restoration of
certainty). Finally, we explored the possibility that the
more pronounced support for national leadership exhibited by high (vs. low) need for closure individuals will be
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restricted to decisive (albeit rigid) leadership perceived
as more likely to promote closure, and that high (vs.
low) need for closure persons will be less supportive of
an open-minded leader with the potential to perpetuate
uncertainty (Study 5).
If this pattern of results is found, it would suggest
that the terrorist ideologues were correct in their
assertion that the threat of terrorist attacks is psychologically unsettling, and induces insecurity. However,
the predicted pattern of results regarding an increase
in group solidarity is inconsistent with the aim of some
terrorists to destabilize the state and to encourage social
change away from current leadership and policy.
Finally, the predicted reactions to terrorist attacks are
consistent with the ideologues who strive to elicit an
extreme response from their targets in the form of
‘‘jujitsu politics.’’

STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed as an initial test of several hypotheses about need for closure and the social response to
terrorism. Our ﬁrst study was carried out with a sample
of elderly individuals from the Netherlands. The ﬁrst
goal in this research was to test the relation between a
sense of insecurity fostered by the threat of terrorism
and the need for closure. We reasoned that a salient outgroup associated with terrorism in the participants’
vicinity would jeopardize their feelings of safety and
instill in them a sense of insecurity translated into a
heightened need for closure. In this study, we used the
objective percentage of Muslims living in one’s neighborhood as a proxy for the salience of a threatening outgroup. Because Dutch respondents are known to
associate Muslims with terrorism, we hypothesized that
a greater percentage of Muslims in the participants’
neighborhood would elevate their need for cognitive
closure.
In addition, we sought to investigate the link between
need for closure and ingroup identiﬁcation. Need for
closure should lead to increased ingroup identiﬁcation
because it increases the need for a shared social reality,
which is satisﬁed by a cohesive group. Previous research
has provided evidence that manipulating need for closure leads to increased preference for homogenous and
self-resembling groups (Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro, &
Mannetti, 2002) and conformity pressures (De Grada,
Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999). Therefore, we
predicted that need for closure should be positively
related to ingroup identiﬁcation. Finally, we wanted to
investigate the link between need for closure and negative perceptions of the outgroup, with the prediction
that higher levels of need for closure would be associated with more negative perceptions of Muslims.
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Method
Participants
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We approached 110 participants in the three largest
cities in the Netherlands (32 from Amsterdam, 37 from
Rotterdam, and 41 from The Hague), of which 64 were
female and 46 were male. To avoid a student population, and to reﬂect the fact that a large proportion
of the general population in Holland is relatively old,
we chose to focus on an elderly sample. We therefore
speciﬁcally contacted elderly people, but we selected
only those who were both physically and mentally able
to get out on the street by themselves. The age of our
participants ranged from 50 to 97, with a mean of 82.
Participants were approached at homes for the elderly
where they were residents. No effects of gender appeared
on any of our dependent variables; hence, this factor is
not considered further.
Materials and Procedure
Participants responded to a questionnaire titled ‘‘The
Perception and Experience by Elderly People of Cultural
Relations.’’ In the introduction, all participants were
reminded of both the international and national context
of terrorism. Speciﬁcally, we mentioned the 9=11 attacks
on several targets in the United States and the killing of
the nationally famous Dutch Islam critic and ﬁlm director Theo van Gogh by Islamic terrorists in November
2004. The questionnaire included the scales assessing
need for closure, identiﬁcation with the Dutch ingroup,
neighborhood in which the participant lived, and perceptions of the Muslim outgroup.
Percentage of muslims in participants’ neighborhood. Participants indicated the neighborhood in
which they lived. Using these responses, we used indicators from the Central Ofﬁce of Statistics affording a
reliable measure of the actual percentage of Muslims
in each participant’s neighborhood. Across the different
neighborhoods in which our participants resided, these
percentages ranged from 0.2% to 24.6%, with a mean
of 10.2% (SD ¼ 7.9%).
Need for cognitive closure. We measured the need
for closure with six items, derived from the larger Need
for Closure Scale (Dutch translation of the Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994, instrument). Sample items include ‘‘I
don’t like situations that are uncertain’’ and ‘‘I feel
uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention
is unclear to me.’’ All items were answered on a 5-point
Likert scale with response alternatives ranging from 1
(totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). Cronbach’s alpha
for this scale was .61.

Identification with the dutch ingroup. This scale
was measured with two items: ‘‘I feel attached to the
Netherlands’’ and ‘‘I am happy to be Dutch.’’ Items
were derived from a scale by Doosje, Ellemers, and
Spears (1995). Both items were answered on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally
agree). These two items were highly correlated (r ¼ .64,
p < .001).
Perception of islamic outgroup. We used a ‘‘feeling
thermometer’’ to assess participants’ impressions of
the Islamic outgroup (see, e.g., Esses, Haddock, &
Zanna, 1993). The response could range between ‘‘0’’
degrees (extremely unfavorable) and ‘‘100’’ degrees
(extremely favorable).
Results and Discussion
We conducted a series of linear regression analyses to
test our hypotheses. Our ﬁrst objective was to test the
link between insecurity as reﬂected by the percentage
of Muslims in one’s neighborhood and need for closure.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that the percentage of Muslims signiﬁcantly predicted the need for
closure, b ¼ .285, F(1, 108) ¼ 9.54, R2 ¼ .08, p < .01.
Next, we tested the hypothesis that need for closure predicts ingroup identiﬁcation and outgroup perceptions.
Need for closure was positively related to ingroup
identiﬁcation, b ¼ .524, F(1, 108) ¼ 40.90, R2 ¼ .28,
p < .001, and need for closure was negatively related to
impressions of the Muslim outgroup, b ¼ .291, F(1,
108) ¼ 9.98, R2 ¼ .09, p < .01.
These results are consistent with our conceptual
analysis. In many European states, Muslims are perceived as members of a foreign culture associated with
terrorism. Their presence in one’s neighborhood may
thus undermine the indigenous residents’ (European
Dutch) sense of security, thus elevating their need for
closure. In line with this analysis, the percentage of
Muslims in one’s neighborhood was positively related
to the need for closure. It seems that the perceived threat
of terrorism elevates the need for closure. In principle,
the correlational nature of these data leaves open the
direction of causality issue between the threat variable
and the need for closure variable, and it allows that both
variables are the consequence of some third factor. The
best way to address this problem would be to experimentally manipulate the threat variable and to subsequently measure the need for closure variable. Our
second study was designed to do just this.
In addition, Study 1 provided evidence that need for
closure prompts individuals to rally around the ingroup;
this is attested to by the positive correlation between
need for closure and ingroup identiﬁcation and by the
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negative correlation between need for closure and
impressions of the Muslim outgroup, which conceptually replicates the relation between need for closure
and ‘‘group centrism’’ (Kruglanski et al., 2006), under
conditions wherein need for closure is heightened by
the presence of threat. This suggests that high (vs. low)
need for closure individuals are more protective of their
ingroup and are biased in its favor, raising the possibility that individuals with a high (vs. low) need for closure would be more severe in their attitudes toward a
threatening outgroup, which in the U.S. context might
translate into support for tough counterterrorism policies. The latter hypothesis was speciﬁcally examined in
our third study.
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STUDY 2
Our second study was designed to experimentally test
the prediction that the threat of terrorism increases the
need for closure. Hence, Study 2 examined the effects
of confrontations with a reminder of the 9=11 terrorist
attacks on the need for closure. Speciﬁcally, we exposed
American participants to a slide show that reminded
them of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
and measured their subsequent responses to the Need
for Closure Scale. Even though this scale was developed
to tap a relatively stable trait variable, and was shown to
exhibit reasonable test–retest reliability, we assumed
that a particularly powerful situational reminder of the
threat of terrorism would sufﬁciently affect participants’
recollections so as to yield elevated scores on this
measure.
Method
Participants
Sixty-three undergraduates at the University of
Maryland (42 female, 21 male) participated in the study
for partial course credit. The age of participants ranged
from 18 to 27, with a mean age of 20. There were no
signiﬁcant effects of gender on any of the dependent
variables. Therefore, the gender factor is omitted from
further discussions.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to view either a
slide show containing pictures and text depicting the
9=11 terrorist attacks or a 7-min control video containing a message about the advantages of working at
Google. Each participant watched the appropriate visual presentation in a private room. After watching the
video, each participant was taken to another lab room
to complete a measure of state affect (Watson, Clark,
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& Tellegen, 1988) and the short form of the Need for
Closure Scale (Pierro & Kruglanski, 2006). The affect
measure was used as a ﬁller task between the visual presentation and completion of the Need for Closure Scale.
9=11 stimulus. The 9=11 slide show was meant to
remind participants of the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center. It included 43 pictures accompanied by
text describing in detail the events that occurred. The
slide show covered various aspects of the event including
close-up depictions of buildings, victims, survivors, and
rescue workers. For instance, a portion of the text stated, ‘‘Some 25 minutes apart, the towers crumble to
the ground, entombing thousands still trapped inside’’;
‘‘The infernos surpass 1,500 degrees’’; and ‘‘Burned,
bleeding, sheathed in dust, the survivors emerge.’’ The
slideshow took approximately 7 min to watch.
Control video. A video designed to communicate to
engineers why they should work for Google was used
as a neutral control stimulus. This video was selected
because of the neutrality of work facilities as a subject
matter and the general familiarity with the Google company, which should foster relatively neutral responses.
This presentation was similar in length to the critical
9=11 slide show, lasting 7 min 21 s. It included audio
and video sequences describing the facilities at Google.
State affect. Participants completed the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988), a widely
used 20-item scale that reﬂects two independent dimensions of positive and negative affect. Example adjectives
include ‘‘interested’’ and ‘‘excited’’ for positive affect
and ‘‘distressed’’ and ‘‘nervous’’ for negative affect.
Instructions asked participants to indicate the extent
to which they experienced the affect described by each
adjective ‘‘right now, that is, at the present moment.’’
All items were answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
and were averaged to create a composite score.
Cronbach’s alpha was .88 for positive affect and .81
for negative affect.
Need for cognitive closure. Participants completed
the 14-item short form of the Need for Closure Scale
(Pierro & Kruglanski, 2006). Example items include
‘‘In case of uncertainty, I prefer to make an immediate
decision, whatever it may be’’ and ‘‘Any solution to a
problem is better than remaining in a state of uncertainty.’’ All items were answered on a 6-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly
agree). Items were averaged to form a composite score.
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .80. Participants
whose mean response to two lie items, ‘‘I have never
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hurt another person’s feelings’’ and ‘‘I have never been
late for work or for an appointment,’’ exceeded the midpoint of the scale were excluded from subsequent data
analysis.
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Results and Discussion
We predicted that participants would score higher on
the Need for Closure Scale after watching the 9=11
stimuli than after watching the control video about the
facilities at Google. This prediction was conﬁrmed as
we found that participants scored signiﬁcantly higher
on the Need for Closure Scale in the 9=11 condition
(M ¼ 3.38, SD ¼ .67) than in the control condition
(M ¼ 3.01, SD ¼ .61), F(1, 50) ¼ 4.24, g2 ¼ .08, p < .05.
Of importance, there were no signiﬁcant differences
between the two conditions on positive or negative
affect. In addition, there were no signiﬁcant differences
between the two conditions on any single affect item.
These data suggest that the need for closure is heightened following a terrorist attack. A brief reminder in a
lab setting of a troubling terrorist event was capable of
elevating participants’ need for closure, as assessed by
a scale normally designed to tap stable individual differences. This is consistent with terrorist ideologues’ claims
that terrorist events result in a sense of insecurity, which
psychologically includes an elevation of the need for
cognitive closure. It is important to note that the
manipulation did not tease apart the speciﬁc aspects of
terrorism that may arouse the need for closure (e.g.,
mortality salience, threat from an outgroup). Nonetheless, it provides direct evidence that the speciﬁc threat
of terrorism evokes heightened need for closure.

outgroup, we expected that in the U.S. context this
may translate into support for tough counterterrorism
measures. Because Study 1 found a relation between
need for closure and negative perceptions of the outgroup, we predicted that need for closure will be positively related to support for tough counterterrorism.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited by e-mail to participate
in a study concerning their opinions on various topics.
They were nonpaid volunteers contacted through an
informal network of social connections. The researchers sent an initial message to students, friends, and
family members. Each of these was asked to participate
in the study and to forward the link to as many individuals as they would like, with the assurance of complete anonymity. All participants were unaware of the
research topic and the hypothesis of the study. Our
recruitment procedures yielded a sample of 192 adults,
of which 131 were female and 59 male. The participant
sample included individuals from 25 states. Their age
ranged from 18 to 72, with a mean age of 36.
Ninety-four percent of the sample was registered to
vote, and all those who registered indicated their intention to vote in the next presidential election. The study
was carried out between December 23, 2005, and
January 23, 2006. One hundred seventy-four participants were European American (90.6%), 3 participants were African American (1.6%), 6 participants
were Asian American (3.1%), 7 participants were of
other ethnicities (3.6%); 2 participants did not report
their ethnicity.

STUDY 3
Materials and Procedure
The aim of our third study was to replicate and extend
the ﬁndings from Study 1 linking need for closure to
ingroup identiﬁcation and negative impressions of the
outgroup. To do this, we used an American sample,
and we operationalized our variables differently.
Whereas in Study 1, we examined individuals’ identiﬁcation with their speciﬁc national group (i.e., with the
Netherlands), in the present study we looked at the
degree to which persons perceive themselves as generally
interdependent with (and hence attached to) others. In
this way, we hoped to replicate the relation found in
Study 1 between need for closure and identiﬁcation with
the ingroup as operationalized via individuals’ interdependent self-construal, allowing us to study the
psychological tendency to act as a collective independent
from any speciﬁc national category.
Second, insofar as negative perceptions of the outgroup may lead to animosity toward a threatening

Participants arrived at the Internet survey via a link
provided in the recruitment message. They ﬁrst completed a measure of interdependent self-construal and
subsequently responded to the Need for Closure Scale.
Finally, they ﬁlled out a questionnaire measuring their
attitudes toward speciﬁc counterterrorism tactics that
enjoyed prominence in the news media at the time.
Interdependent self-construal. Participants completed the 12-item interdependent self-construal scale
(Singelis, 1994). Sample items include ‘‘It is important
for me to maintain harmony within my group’’ and ‘‘I
will sacriﬁce my self interest for the beneﬁt of the group
I am in.’’ All items were answered on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Items were averaged to form a composite score
(Cronbach’s a ¼ .69).
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Need for cognitive closure. Participants completed
the shortened Need for Closure Scale (Pierro &
Kruglanski, 2006) already described in connection with
Study 2 (Cronbach’s a ¼ .82).
Support for tough counterterrorism tactics. Participants responded to 12 items tapping their support for
various counterterrorism tactics. Items included, ‘‘I think
Congress ought to renew the Patriot Act without any
changes,’’ ‘‘I think George W. Bush is the best man to
lead the country,’’ ‘‘I support the U.S. role in the war
on terrorism,’’ ‘‘Terrorism should be fought by any
means necessary,’’ ‘‘National security is more important
than individual rights,’’ ‘‘Current laws are too lenient to
ﬁght terrorism,’’ ‘‘I am willing to give up some liberties
to win the war on terror,’’ ‘‘The CIA should be able to
torture prisoners in order to win the war on terror,’’
‘‘The military should be able to torture prisoners in order
to win the war on terror,’’ ‘‘It is wrong for the U.S. to
maintain secret prisons in foreign countries (reverse
scored),’’ ‘‘The proposed ban on prisoner torture hinders
the government’s ability to collect intelligence on terrorists’’ and ‘‘Without the PATRIOT Act, the country
would be less safe.’’ All items were answered on a 6-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .93.
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such support may create a sense of optimism that the
threat of terrorism will be averted. Our next study was
designed to investigate this possibility. Speciﬁcally,
Study 4 was designed to replicate the relation between
need for closure and support for counterterrorism policies (found in Study 3) and to investigate the additional
implication that such support will instill in individuals
high on the need for closure a sense of optimism about
the future, and an expectancy of personal safety from
terrorism.
To examine these processes at a moment when the
issues of terrorism and counterterrorism were particularly salient, Study 4 was conducted immediately
following a major, widely discussed terrorist attack.
Toward this purpose, American participants completed
the appropriate questionnaires in the 2 weeks following
the London transit bombing of July 2005. Our speciﬁc
predictions were that (a) the need for closure would be
positively related to support for the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies, (b) need for closure
would be positively related to optimism about future
safety from terrorism, and (c) support for the Bush
administration’s counterterrorism policies would mediate the relationship between need for closure and optimism about future safety.
Method

Results and Discussion
We predicted that need for closure would be positively
related to interdependent self-construals as well as support
for counterterrorism tactics. Linear regression analysis
revealed that need for closure signiﬁcantly predicted
interdependent self-construal, b ¼ .17, F(1, 190) ¼ 5.91,
R2 ¼ .03, p < .05. We also found that need for closure signiﬁcantly predicted support for tough counterterrorist tactics, b ¼ .236, F(1, 190) ¼ 11.24, R2 ¼ .06, p < .001.
In summary, the data of Study 3 conceptually replicate the link between need for closure and ingroup
identiﬁcation, tapped via an indirect measure of the
degree to which individuals perceive themselves as interdependent with others. We also found that need for closure was associated with negative attitudes toward the
outgroup (that in the U.S. context expressed itself in support for severe counterterrorism measures). This ﬁnding
echoes a related result of Study 1, namely, that need for
closure was associated with negative attitudes towards
the Muslim outgroup among Dutch respondents.
STUDY 4
Studies 1 and 3 found that need for closure leads to
negative attitudes toward a threatening outgroup and
support for severe counterterrorism measures. In turn,

Participants
Participants were recruited from two college campuses
in the Washington, DC, area during the 2 weeks following the London Transit Bombing of July 2005. One hundred two students from the University of Maryland and
102 students from Howard University volunteered to participate (137 female, 62 male, 5 did not report their gender). Some participants were recruited from various
undergraduate classes, and others were approached in
public areas of the university campuses, including the student union, outside spaces, and the library. Students who
agreed to participate were asked to complete a packet of
questionnaires. Participants’ ages varied from 18 to 50,
with a mean age of 22. One hundred twenty-two participants were African American (60%), 42 participants
were European American (21%), 14 participants were
Asian American (7%), 13 participants were Hispanic
American (6%), and 13 were of other ethnicities (6%).
No signiﬁcant differences on any of our dependent
variables emerged as a function of gender, age, or ethnicity. Hence, these variables are not considered further.
Materials and Procedure
Participants who agreed to complete the questionnaires were asked to complete the questionnaire independently, without discussing their responses with
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others. The questionnaire packet contained the need for
closure scale, a scale tapping support for the Bush
administration’s counterterrorism policies, and a scale
measuring optimism about future safety from terrorism.
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Need for cognitive closure. Participants completed
the shortened Need for Closure Scale (Pierro &
Kruglanski, 2006), the same as used in Studies 2 and
3. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .70.
Support for the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies. Four items assessed participants’ support
for the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies:
‘‘I support the USA’s role in the war on terror,’’ ‘‘I think
George W. Bush is the best man to lead the country in
the long run,’’ ‘‘Terrorism should be fought by any
means necessary,’’ and ‘‘I think congress ought to renew
the Patriot Act without any changes.’’ All items were
answered on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s
alpha for the scale was .63.
Optimism about future safety from terrorism. Five
items assessed participants’ optimism about future
safety from terrorism: ‘‘Safety in subway, bus, and train
travel will improve dramatically as a result of the
London subway and bus bombings’’; ‘‘Safety in airline
travel will improve dramatically as a result of the
London subway and bus bombings’’; ‘‘The United
States will be able to capture Osama bin Laden’’;
‘‘The risk of terrorist attacks in the U.S. has decreased
as a consequence of the war in Iraq’’; and ‘‘I am conﬁdent that our military, civilian police, and homeland
security personnel will be able to prevent future terrorist
attacks inside the U.S.’’ Answers to all items were
recorded on a 6-point Likert scale with response alternatives ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly
agree). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .64.

found that need for closure signiﬁcantly predicted
optimism about future safety from terrorism, b ¼ .17,
F(1, 199) ¼ 5.33, R2 ¼ .03, p < .05, and support for tough
counterterrorism policy, b ¼ .34, F(1, 189) ¼ 24.61,
R2 ¼ .12, p < .001. In addition, we hypothesized that
support for counterterrorism policy would mediate the
relationship between need for closure and optimism.
Following the method recommended by Baron and
Kenny (1986), we found that the putative mediator, support for tough counterterrorism, uniquely predicted
optimism about future safety from terrorism, b ¼ .51,
t ¼ 7.01, p < .001. However, when controlling for support for counterterrorism, need for closure no longer
signiﬁcantly predicted optimism, b ¼ .004, t ¼ .132,
p ¼ .90. Finally, a Sobel (1982) test found that support
for counterterrorism policy signiﬁcantly mediated the
relationship between need for closure and optimism
about future safety from terrorism, Z ¼ 4.43, p < .001.
Alternative mediational models, inconsistent with our
theoretical analysis, could also be proposed and tested.
We tested each possible mediational model and did
not ﬁnd mediation in any other case. For example, need
for closure did not mediate the relation between support
for counterterrorism and optimism about future safety,
and optimism about future safety did not mediate the
relation between need for closure and support for
counterterrorism.
The results of Study 4 replicate the ﬁnding (of Study
3) that need for closure is positively related to support
for tough counterterrorism policies. In addition, we
found that support for counterterrorism policies leads
to greater optimism about future safety from terrorist
attacks. When decisions are made about uncertain situations, those high on the need for closure are motivated
to support policies that can promise to deliver closure.
To the extent that the threat of terrorism undermines
closure and elevates the need for closure (as the results
of Studies 1 and 2 suggest), support for resolute counterterrorist policies should fulﬁll the need for closure,
resulting in optimism. Our ﬁndings seem consistent with
this general interpretation.

Results and Discussion
Preliminary Analysis
There were no signiﬁcant differences between the two
universities (Howard University and University of
Maryland) on any of our dependent variables. We thus
combined the two university samples.
Mediational Analysis
We hypothesized that need for closure would predict
support for tough counterterrorism policy as well as
optimism about future safety from terrorism. These predictions were supported in our data. Speciﬁcally, we

STUDY 5
Our research so far ﬁnds that need for closure is associated with support for policies and leadership that are in
place. Before concluding that need for closure leads to
support for government leadership, it is important to
address a possible moderating factor that may qualify
our ﬁndings. Note that in Studies 3 and 4, support for
governmental policies meant also support for ﬁrm and
resolute policies (tough counterterrorism policies) that
may seem to promise a restoration of stability and closure. The question, therefore, is whether the relation
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between need for closure and support for group leadership will hold when leadership is conceptually separated
from a resolute decision making style. If what matters is
that the leadership appears to be an effective ‘‘closure
provider,’’ then it is conceivable that the need for closure
would exhibit a negative relation with support for leadership if it appears irresolute and likely to perpetuate
uncertainty and ambiguity.
Relevant to the present concerns, Landau et al.
(2004) and Cohen, Oglivie, Solomon, Greenberg, and
Pyszczynski (2005) found that mortality salience manipulations increased support for President Bush and
decreased support for John Kerry portrayed by political
opponents as indecisive (‘‘ﬂip-ﬂopper’’). Landau et al. and
Cohen et al. also showed that mortality salience and
reminders of terrorism function in a similar manner,
and indeed, some recent work argues that mortality
salience may increase the need for closure (Dechesne &
Kruglanski, 2004). Therefore, the work of Landau
et al. and Cohen et al. provides a preliminary test of
the idea that those high in the need for closure will
support a decisive leader and decrease support for an
open-minded leader. Nonetheless, the Landau et al.
and Cohen et al. results are merely suggestive, as their
studies did not explore what particular features of each
leader were appealing to participants. As Bush and
Kerry differ in many ways apart from the decisiveness
dimension, it is difﬁcult to know exactly what leader
characteristics prompted the participants’ judgments.
To overcome this limitation, the current study asks
participants to rate their support for descriptions of an
unknown leader, thereby removing the inﬂuence of
any prior notions about a particular candidate.
Method
Participants
Eighty-ﬁve undergraduates at the University of
Maryland participated in this study for partial course
credit. Fifty-four participants were female and 28 were
male. Three participants did not report their gender.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 28 years, with a
mean age of 19 years. Gender did not exert any effects,
and therefore it is not discussed further.
Materials and Procedure
Participants ﬁrst completed the shortened Need for
Closure Scale. Next, they received written instructions
introduced as follows: ‘‘Though the 2008 presidential
election is two years away, candidates are starting to
prepare their campaigns. One potential candidate is
described below.’’ Participants were randomly assigned
to receive a description of a candidate as either openminded or decisive. Candidates were described in gender
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neutral terms and were not associated with any political
party in order to reduce the likelihood that participants
would recall actual political candidates. Participants
were asked about their support for the potential candidate and a manipulation check assessing the perceived
decisiveness of the leader was included among the
dependent measures.
The decisive leader. The description of the decisive
leader read,
One potential candidate for the 2008 Presidential election has been described as stable and consistent. This
candidate is a decisive leader capable of making quick
decisions. In addition, this candidate holds ﬁrm beliefs.
This candidate believes in standing up for and defending
one’s own perspective while ensuring that a decision is
made. Because of these beliefs, this candidate thinks that
government policy and plans should be decided on
quickly and followed through to completion.

The open-minded leader. The description of this
leader read,
One potential candidate for the 2008 Presidential election has been described as ﬂexible and adaptive. This
candidate is a questioning leader capable of seeing multiple perspectives. In addition, this candidate believes in
challenging ideas. This candidate believes in the practice
of an open debate of ideas and values a diversity of viewpoints. Because of these beliefs, this candidate thinks
that government policy and plans should be changed
according to the best available information.

Need for cognitive closure. Participants completed
the shortened Need for Closure Scale (Pierro &
Kruglanski, 2006), as used in Studies 2, 3, and 4.
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .74.
Support for the candidate. Support for the candidate was assessed by means of seven items. Three items,
responded to on a 9-point Likert scale with response
alternatives ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9
(strongly agree), stated, ‘‘This candidate would make a
good president,’’ ‘‘I would approve of this candidate
as a leader,’’ and ‘‘This candidate is the right person
to lead the country.’’ One item with response alternatives ranging from 1 (not at all favorably) to 9 (extremely
favorably) stated, ‘‘How favorably do you view this candidate?’’ Two items with response alternatives ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much) stated, ‘‘To what
extent do you admire this candidate?’’ and ‘‘How much
conﬁdence would you have in this candidate as a leader?’’ Finally one item, with the response alternatives
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ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 9 (extremely likely)
stated, ‘‘How likely is it that you would vote for this
candidate?’’ The average of these items served as a composite score. Cronbach’s alpha for the open-minded leader was .95 and for the decisive leader was .97.

a leader who is ﬂexible and adaptive and who does not
adhere to a belief system or a course of action come
what may.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Decisiveness of candidate. The perceived decisiveness of each political candidate was assessed using three
items, serving as a manipulation check. The three items
were ‘‘This candidate is a decisive leader,’’ ‘‘This candidate was conﬁdent in her or his decisions,’’ and ‘‘This
candidate avoided ambiguity.’’ These items were
answered on a 9-point Likert scale with the response
alternatives ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9
(strongly agree). The average of these scores was computed to arrive at a composite score. Cronbach’s alpha
for this scale was .69 for the decisive leader and .86
for the open-minded leader.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
To check our manipulation of the decisiveness of the
political candidate, we conducted a one-way analysis of
variance comparing the two groups on ratings of the
candidate’s decisiveness. The decisive leader was rated
as signiﬁcantly more decisive (M ¼ 6.9) than the
open-minded leader (M ¼ 4.4), F(1, 83) ¼ 59.7, g2 ¼ .42,
p < .001. In addition, the open-minded leader (M ¼ 5.91)
received a signiﬁcantly higher level of support overall
than the decisive leader (M ¼ 4.83), F(1, 83) ¼ 8.36,
g2 ¼ .09, p < .01.
Next, we tested the predicted interaction between the
description of the political candidate and need for closure. We tested the two-way interaction between need for
closure and decisiveness of the leader using a linear
regression with the decisiveness manipulation entered
as a dummy variable. The predicted two-way interaction
between need for closure and decisiveness of the leader
was signiﬁcant, b ¼ 2.07, t ¼ 3.74, p < .001. In the decisive leader condition, need for closure was positively
related to support for the leader, b ¼ .44, F(1, 41) ¼
9.79, R2 ¼ .20, p < .01. When the leader was described
as open-minded need for closure was negatively related
to support for the candidate, b ¼ .31, F(1, 41) ¼ 4.24,
R2 ¼ .09, p < .05.
The results from Study 5 suggest that need for closure
does not lead to indiscriminant support for any leader
but rather for a leader regarded as decisive. In fact, need
for closure was negatively related to support for an
open-minded leader. That is, participants high on the
need for closure seem to support decisive leadership that
promises to provide the necessary closure. However,
participants low on the need for closure seem to prefer

Terrorist ideologues have articulated arguments for the
efﬁcacy of terrorism as a tactic of psychological warfare.
The most basic tenet of their argument has been that
terrorism impacts the society targeted by the attack by
creating an aversive psychological state of insecurity.
As the ideologues of terrorism intuited correctly, our
data imply that acts of terrorism instill in individuals
an elevated need for cognitive closure (Studies 1 and 2).
Although terrorist ideologues agree on the initial
psychological impact of terrorist attacks, there is divergence of opinions among the ideologues regarding the
resulting perceptions and behaviors of individuals in
the targeted group. One possibility offered by the ideologues is that the aversion toward uncertainty will result
in a reluctance to support the current leadership who
was ineffective in preventing the terrorist attack. This
would destabilize the state and open the door to a
political alternative. The second possibility is that the
elevated aversion toward uncertainty would lead to a
rallying around the ﬂag and an aggressive defense of
the group. This would play into the strategy of ‘‘jujitsu
politics’’ in which the terrorists desire to elicit an overresponse from the targets of their attacks. The third
potential objective of terrorist ideologues involves an
attempt to induce a speciﬁc policy change.
The data presented here suggest that, rather than
undermining support for government as Bakunin,
Kropotkin, and Marighela predicted, need for closure
arousal may enhance the feelings of solidarity among
group members (Studies 1 and 3), often manifesting
itself in negative attitudes toward outgroups (Studies
1, 3, and 4), and support for tough counterterrorism tactics (Studies 3 and 4). As Study 4 further found, support
for tough counterterrorism may account for the relation
between need for closure and optimism about future
safety from terrorism. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the expectations of terrorist ideologues who wish to
evoke a strong response from their perceived enemies.
Such ‘‘rallying around the ﬂag’’ was shown to lead to
bias against outgroups and the use of costly counterterrorism strategies (e.g., the use of military warfare and
torture). This also suggests that acts of terrorism could
lead to reactance against the terrorists’ wishes, and
attempts to show solidarity and strength in the face of
threat rather than conceding to their demands for policy
change.
Even though the terrorist ideologues who argued for
the destabilization model may have been imprecise
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regarding the use of terrorist tactics to undermine
leadership, their intuition may not have been completely
off the mark. Speciﬁcally, our results suggest that
although the need for closure may prompt a ‘‘rally
effect’’ and support for the leadership of one’s group,
these tendencies may be importantly qualiﬁed by the
perceived potential of the leadership to restore certainty
and closure. In this vein, Study 5 results suggest that
though need for closure is positively related to support
for a decisive leader, it is negatively related to support
for an indecisive one. Put simply, need for closure is
positively related to support for individuals or activities
that seem likely to provide closure and is negatively
related to support for individuals and activities that
seem likely to undermine closure. It is possible then, that
acts of terrorism and the resulting elevation in the need
for closure could lead to a destabilization of the state in
conditions in which the leader is perceived to be less
decisive.
It is also of interest that whereas a leader whose style
seems decisive and resolute, and hence whose leadership
may be appealing in times of uncertainty, may lose support in circumstances where such leadership did not
result in the expected restoration of stability and closure.
This is not to suggest that a failure of a decisive leader
would necessarily prompt a preference for an openminded one. Instead, a failure of a given (decisive)
course of action may dispose individuals to support
an alternative albeit equally ‘‘decisive’’ course. These
matters could be proﬁtably investigated in future
research.
Similarly, if standing up against the demands for
policy change made by terrorists is likely to result in
more, rather than less, uncertainty, then in those cases
terrorism could lead to concessions. For example, when
the use of a speciﬁc policy (e.g., the use of troops in a
region) does not foster the sense of security desired,
the strategy may be abandoned if such abandonment
is thought to reduce the threat of terrorism.

(Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001), become religious (Schuster
et al., 2001), participate in more group functions
(Schuster et al., 2001), display national symbols to a
greater extent (Skitka, 2005), increase trust in the
government (Chanley, 2002), and become more aggressive (toward outgroups; Argyrides & Downey, 2004).
Overall, our data suggest that an individual, microlevel epistemic motivation such as the need for closure
may play an important role in mediating broad, macrolevel, societal phenomena such as those involved in personal, and societal responses to terrorism with far
reaching political implications.
Future research is needed to better understand the
nature of the relationships among the concepts of
insecurity, uncertainty, need for safety, and need for
closure. In the present research, we found that the threat
of terrorism leads to increased need for closure. Yet we
cannot be sure of why this is the case, as it remains possible that that safety concerns, mortality salience, or
some other variable could be driving this effect, rather
than uncertainty. Therefore, future research could profitably explore the mediating mechanism(s) for this effect
and the interrelations among these constructs.
Although the present data show that dispositional
need for closure can lead to optimism about future
safety when strong counterterrorism measures are perceived to be taken, it is not clear that situational inducements of the need for closure would have the same
effect. It is possible that the elevations in need for closure in times of threat lead to optimism as a way of buffering the threat, thereby restoring a sense of closure.
Indeed, past research on the need for closure has found
identical relations between the need for closure and
other variables when need for closure is operationalized
according to trait scales and situational inducements
(Kruglanski, 2004). Future research could explore
whether the need for closure induced by terrorist attacks
leads to similar optimism as has been found here with
dispositional need for closure.

CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
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